

**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

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**NATIONAL GUARD ENHANCED READINESS BRIGADES:  
THE ACHILLES HEEL OF OUR NATIONAL MILITARY  
STRATEGY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT**

**BY**

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## ABSTRACT

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The war-fighting readiness of the Army National Guard combat brigades (enhanced brigades) is more critical today than ever before. Changing defense needs due to the end of the cold war and budgetary constraints have increased reliance on enhanced brigades and on their ability to deploy within 90 days of mobilization to any number of regional conflicts. However, deficiencies noted during the brigades' mobilization for the Persian Gulf War raised questions about the time to be ready to deploy and training strategies. Is the dependence on the National Guard enhanced brigades to deploy to a theater trained and ready within 90 days of mobilization a sound strategy? This study assesses the capability of the enhanced brigades to meet this requirement, and offers recommendations to enhance their readiness posture. The implementation of these recommendations leads to systemic changes and better integration among all the components to insure the enhanced brigades are truly the nations strategic insurance.



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For nearly a decade American political and military leaders have struggled over the best way to organize, structure and lead the Army in the post Cold-War. In the middle of all this ambiguity, 1997 promises to be a memorable year as the results of the Quadrennial Review will be an essential element of consideration in the formulation of defense policy, strategy, and force structure well into the 21st century. Regardless of whether we base our structure on one major regional contingency (MRC) or more, two factors remain constant in our national military posture: first, the Army will remain a power projection Army primarily based in the United States; and secondly, the Army will continue to depend enormously on the Total Force (Reserve and Army National Guard).

Power projection is a key tenant of our National Military Strategy and the "readiness and responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force"<sup>1</sup> is a critical pillar. This Reserve establishment covers the entire spectrum of the Army from fuel handlers to tank crewman. Paramount in the Reserve forces are the Army National Guard Enhanced Readiness Brigades (fifteen combat brigades consisting of armor, mechanized infantry, and light infantry). Their charter is to deploy trained and ready 90 days from mobilization.

It is this aspect of the Total Force strategy that requires fresh and careful examination. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the capability of the National Guard enhanced readiness brigades (enhanced brigades) to meet this deployment requirement and to suggest some corrective actions to systemic problems. Also, this study will focus on the heavy enhanced brigades (armor and mechanized infantry) and

will not address units of the United States Army Reserve or other units of the Army National Guard.

By its nature -- looking at the problems -- the focus of this effort tends to be negative. It is important to note, however, that the bottom line is not negative. There has been an enormous improvement in Reserve readiness in the last decade. The citizen-soldier of the United States is the best in our history and many argue more capable than the active forces of many other nations.<sup>2</sup> While this has been a tough and successful team effort, the active force today has improved more rapidly than the Reserve -- so the long standing readiness rift (between the active and Reserve forces) remains and has perhaps increased.

#### **Setting the Stage -- Statement of the Problem**

Few will argue that changing defense needs and budgetary constraints have increased the reliance on the National Guard combat brigades. But is the dependence on the enhanced brigades to deploy to a theater trained and ready in 90 days a sound strategy? The National Guard heavy enhanced brigades are not able to meet the 90 day readiness standard. Combat forces from the National Guard have not met this standard historically; they have inherent training limitations and constraints which still exist; the organization of the Army National Guard is complicated and does not support peacetime training or the integration of the active and Reserve components; and Army initiatives to remedy the problem have had limited impact. In order to fully grasp these concepts, it is important to understand the Total Force in a historic context.

### **Background -- What is the Total Force?**

The role of the Reserve and the National Guard was altered considerably by the events of the 1970's. The end of conscription and major force reductions were the catalyst that brought the United States Army Reserve and National Guard to the forefront of our national military strategy. More importantly, it was the haunting experience of Vietnam that convinced political and military leaders that never again would this country go to war without mobilizing the Reserve and National Guard.<sup>3</sup> Thus was born the Total Force Army. No longer were the Reserve and National Guard considered second stringers in the eyes of defense planners.

But what role should the Reserves and National Guard play? This question was answered by Army recruiters. The active force was reduced to sixteen divisions and active duty end strength dropped due to the transition to the all-volunteer force. In short, the Army had more combat units than could be filled by active duty soldiers. The CAPSTONE program was introduced which aligned Reserve and National Guard units with the active force based on wartime requirements. Moreover, seven divisions were composed of two active component brigades and one Reserve or National Guard Brigade. These Reserve or National Guard brigades were called roundout brigades and would deploy with their active duty division.<sup>4</sup> Although there is a solid argument that US national security requirements caused this fundamental change, it was manpower and fiscal constraints that were the genesis of the Total Army concept.

In 1991, the Army adopted a new training strategy called -- Bold Shift -- that refocused peacetime training goals and assigned active duty advisors to the roundout

In 1991, the Army adopted a new training strategy called -- Bold Shift -- that refocused peacetime training goals and assigned active duty advisors to the roundout brigades.<sup>5</sup> The active force was reduced again in 1993 to ten divisions requiring a new look at the role of the Reserve establishment. The Desert Shield/ Desert Storm experience with the roundout brigades ultimately led to their abolishment. The roundout brigades evolved into the National Guard Enhanced Readiness Brigade concept.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, the 1994 Active/Reserve Offsite Agreement provided the final shape of the Total Force policy as understood today. The agreement placed the majority (90%) of the combat forces in the National Guard and converted the United States Army Reserve to combat support and combat service support units. It also outlined the training strategy and resource priorities for the enhanced brigades and added additional active duty soldiers to assist in their train-up.<sup>7</sup>

#### **Readiness – An Historical perspective**

The nation's experience with mobilizing its reserve forces and getting them into the fight quickly has not been a success story. During WW II, eighteen National Guard Divisions were mobilized. Their readiness to deploy overseas ranged from eleven months to forty-seven months.<sup>8</sup> The Korean mobilization was no better. Four divisions were called to active duty, two entered combat in January of 1952 after eighteen months of intense training and the remaining two divisions deployed to Europe after fourteen months of post mobilization efforts.<sup>9</sup>

In all fairness, it must be noted that training readiness was not the only problem that plagued these forces. Some units were purposely delayed due to the lack of strategic lift and the fact that National Guard divisions were a primary source for individual replacements in the early stages of both conflicts. These forces also lacked adequate equipment, training facilities and time. Moreover, the training standards were different from the current enhanced brigades (WW II and Korean era forces deployed as divisions). Units required nearly a year of training to prepare for combat.<sup>10</sup> Yet, there are some parallels between the WW II and Korean experience and the current training readiness issues of the enhanced brigades. Observers noted during National Guard maneuvers in 1940 and mobilization training in 1950, that units required at least three months of intense basic training before progressing to unit level train-up.<sup>11</sup>

The Gulf War was the first large scale call-up of National Guard combat forces under the Total Force umbrella and brought out the good and bad of the program. The Army was able to deploy 23 Army National Guard colonel level commands and 37 lieutenant colonel commands in support of Desert Storm.<sup>12</sup> These units were predominantly combat service support. Two Army National Guard artillery brigades deployed to Saudi Arabia within 45 days of mobilization. Both units conducted intense training during Desert Shield and performed well in the ground campaign. It is important to note that both units completed section certification and battery live fire during annual training just 30 days prior to mobilization.<sup>13</sup>

The Army National Guard combat brigades (armor and mechanized infantry) did not fare nearly as well. Three National Guard roundout combat brigades were mobilized. Two brigades completed training at 91 and 106 days. Trainers estimated the third brigade would have needed 135 days. Furthermore, the Army estimated that each of the brigades would have needed an additional 24 days to prepare equipment and people for deployment. Therefore, estimated times for the three brigades to begin deployment were 115, 130 and 159 days.<sup>14</sup> Also, the three brigades had over 9000 active duty soldiers assisting in their train-up.<sup>15</sup> These soldiers were not integrated as members of the Brigades but were used as observer/controllers and evaluators during training events.

Although the Guard brigades did not meet the 90 day readiness standard, it was not a bad showing considering the brigades had none of the enhancements which exist today. Moreover, there is a viable argument that the Guard brigades were subjected to a double standard. A Congressional Research Service report on mobilization found that some active Army brigades with the same training status ratings were allowed to deploy immediately.<sup>16</sup>

Even if the Army's decision not to deploy the Guard brigades was politically motivated, there still existed some serious readiness issues. A US General Accounting Office study showed that many of the Guard soldiers lacked battlefield survival skills and that nearly one third of the soldiers in the three brigades had either dental conditions or physical ailments which prevented their deployment. ( In many cases, however, the Army regulation could have been waived). The study further suggests that even with improvements from the many lessons learned, National Guard heavy combat units will

continue to require intense post-mobilization training of at least 120 days to complete battalion and brigade level maneuver.<sup>17</sup>

Therefore, the Army's dependence on the National Guard enhanced brigades to go to war on short notice is a risky venture. Although efforts have been made over the years to improve the readiness of our National Guard, no armor or mechanized infantry unit has met the 90 day readiness requirement.

### **Training Limitations**

The enhanced brigades face significant training limitations. That said, the most important is neither money nor people, but rather it is time available for unit readiness preparation. The enhanced brigades have 39 days available to train for their Federal mission. Yet, the available days are significantly less when one considers that some of these days are taken by mandatory State requirements such as riot training, crowd control, and city security techniques. Moreover, the citizen-soldier averages over 65 miles one way when traveling to local training sites. For collective training areas, they must travel much farther because local training areas generally cannot accommodate mounted maneuver or gunnery. National Guard combat brigades average over 150 miles to a collective training site.<sup>18</sup> Also, equipment recovery, maintenance, and administrative requirements quickly consume training time. Estimates indicate that enhanced brigades can count on half of their 39 days as productive training time focusing on their wartime mission.<sup>19</sup> This is the principle factor hampering the capability of enhanced brigades to deploy early.

Furthermore, like active units, enhanced brigades are not immune to personnel turbulence. They average 23 % turnover annually from relocation.<sup>20</sup> When you add in moves within the units for professional development and promotions the turnover approaches 50%.<sup>21</sup> This turbulence is not so alarming when one considers it is consistent with the active force. Yet, the impact is certainly more devastating in the National Guard. This personnel turnover, whether it be personnel leaving the unit or changing jobs within a unit , makes it difficult to maintain stable crews who have worked together long enough to have established an adequate level of proficiency. Add to this the fact that only half of the training days are actually available and you have a formula for failure. Also, the heavy enhanced brigades are equipped with M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles which are complex and technical requiring a higher learning curve and frequent sustainment training.

There are many inherent training limitations within the National Guard. Although additional resources do have some impact on readiness, time and geography are clearly negative factors. These constraints existed before the conception of the Total Force structure and perhaps are the most critical factors which degrades the capability of the enhanced brigades from achieving their peacetime training goals.

### **National Guard Organization**

The Congress shall have power...To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress<sup>22</sup>

Perhaps it is this quote from the United States Constitution more than any other that has caused such consternation between the active component and the National Guard. No one in the active component or the National Guard questions the absolute primacy of the chain of command when we go to war. In this scenario, enhanced brigades are attached to a division or work with a Corps as a separate brigade. Yet, the active army is very uneasy about the shared command and the uncertainties of divided responsibilities during peacetime.

The organization of the National Guard contributes as a distracter to the readiness of the enhanced brigades. The National Guard is a “hybrid” organization, part state and part federal. As part of the states’ National Guard, the unit is responsible to the state governor to execute missions within the state such as civil disturbance or disaster relief. As the Army national Guard of the United States, the National Guard is part of the reserve component of the Army. The problem is that the National Guard must be “federalized” to become the National Guard of the United States. Normally, federalization occurs during a general mobilization. The federal government, however, exercises control over the National Guard by controlling funding. Over 90% of the funds for the National Guard comes from the federal government. In essence, the National Guard is 54 separate organizations( Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia have a National Guard).<sup>23</sup>

During peacetime, the enhanced brigades are controlled by the Adjutant General of the State (TAG) who reports to the governor of the state. The TAG

coordinates with the Director of the Army National Guard Bureau (see figure 1). The Director of the Army National Guard is directly responsible to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and is the primary advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chief of the National Guard is directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Forces Command (FORSCOM) is responsible for providing training support and assistance for the enhanced brigades through the Continental US Armies (CONUSAs). The CONUSA accomplishes this through the use of Regional Training Brigades (RTBs) within the Training Division and Readiness Groups (RGs).

Furthermore, the active component wartime gaining command provides training guidance for the enhanced brigades. However , they do not control funds nor do they have the final say on training and resources. Therefore, warfighting commanders have limited input into the training of the enhanced brigades that are designated to fight with them in a contingency. It is a complicated chain of command which violates several hard lessons learned about how we conduct unit training.

Our training doctrine insists that “peacetime relationships must mirror wartime task organization to the greatest extent possible”<sup>24</sup> and “realistic training requires organizations to train the way they will fight or support on the battlefield.”<sup>25</sup> The command structure of the National Guard violates these basic tenants of our training philosophy and fragments any unity of effort .




Figure 1. Lines of Authority for the National Guard

Moreover, this command structure exacerbates one of the greatest challenges facing the active and Reserve (Reserve and National Guard) force: their ability to function in a mutually supporting role in peace and war. In fact, the organization of the National Guard ensures that active and National Guard units are *not* integrated. The FORSCOM Commander, a four star billet, is the lowest level at which active and National Guard units share a common commander (although FORSCOM is only a coordinating agency for the National Guard).<sup>26</sup> A US Corps commander, for example, does not command in peacetime any enhanced brigade that is assigned to his corps in wartime. So to say that the command structure of the National Guard integrates the active component is like saying that the Army and Navy are integrated because they are both tenant commands of the Department of Defense.

The National Guard peacetime command structure is not conducive to train the way we intend to fight and degrades any effort made to integrate the active component and the National Guard. The command structure lacks unity of effort and is characterized by redundancy and multiple players. Thus, the very command structure of the National Guard inhibits the capability of enhanced brigades to meet the 90 day readiness standard.

### **Army Responds To Challenge**

The Army recognized the need to for a new and more cohesive relationship with the National Guard due mostly to the Gulf War call-up and the combat deficiencies noted. In 1991, the Army adopted a new training strategy (Bold Shift) which included several initiatives (1) refocused training at the platoon level and

below in an effort to focus on fewer tasks; (2) emphasized the importance of individual soldier and leader training; (3) permitted selected units to recruit 125% of their wartime personnel strength. (4) and added active component advisors called Resident Training Detachments (RTDs) to selected combat brigades. The enhanced brigade concept was finalized in 1993 and an additional 3000 active duty soldiers were added. They formed Regional Training Brigades (RTBs) designed to assist the enhanced brigades in the execution of their training plans with a focus on annual training.<sup>27</sup>

Many of these adjustments to our training strategy make sense and in all fairness the programs cannot be adequately evaluated for several years. Yet, preliminary reports are not encouraging. The US Government Accounting Office conducted a 1995 study of seven former roundout brigades of which six are currently heavy enhanced brigades. It found that the units were fully trained on only 14% of critical platoon tasks, that only four of thirteen heavy battalions met Bold Shift gunnery standards (66-75% of crews qualified), and none of the brigades met leader training goals. In short, not one of the brigades met peacetime training goals.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, there was considerable confusion on the role of the RTDs. The original intent was for these soldiers to fill key positions within the enhanced brigades. However, the legislation establishing the program termed the active duty personnel assigned as “advisers” and the 1992 Army Memorandum of Instruction on the program stated that the RTD staff would focus on assessing training.<sup>29</sup> Currently only one of the fifteen enhanced brigades has an RTD soldier manning a critical

position. Also, the RTD soldiers are assigned to active duty divisions with duty at National Guard enhanced brigade locations. Hence, there is some confusion on the role of the RTD and the effectiveness of the program is determined primarily by the quality of their personal relationships with the brigades. The RTB's were fielded in 1995 so there is limited feedback on the impact of this program.

The study concludes that it is unlikely that enhanced brigades can achieve the 90 day deployment goal.<sup>30</sup> More importantly, the increase in peacetime training proficiency envisioned by the Army Bold Shift initiatives and hence the shortening of postmobilization requirements has not occurred in the first five years of the program.

### **Conclusions**

The force of the evidence suggests that the current reliance on the National Guard Combat Brigades to deploy within 90 days of mobilization is a serious gamble. First , combat brigades from the National Guard historically have not deployed without several months of postmobilization training far exceeding 90 days. Secondly, they are faced with significant training limitations which still exist. Next, the National Guard command structure is a "political dinosaur" which continues to hamper readiness and the "seamless integration" between the active and Reserve forces. Finally, although the infusion of resources (mainly active soldiers detailed to the National Guard) has made some improvements in training management, these initiatives have yet to make any significant impact on the readiness of the enhanced brigades. The bottom line is enhanced brigades cannot meet the 90 day deployment readiness standard.

## **What To Do About It**

Before viable options and adjustments to the Total Force Policy are considered, there are some assumptions which must be understood. First, the bulk of the recommendations will not have an immediate effect on the readiness of the enhanced brigades. They address systemic problems and therefore are mostly long term. Secondly , the recommendations must address training limitations in order to be effective. In short, the recommendations should focus on the better use of training time and minimizing distracters. As noted, Congress normally answers problems in the National Guard (and Reserve) with an infusion of active duty soldiers and money to cure their ills. These actions tend to treat symptoms and never get to the real problems. Finally, all recommendations must enhance the integration of active and National Guard forces.

### **Recommendation One: Planning Assumptions**

The first action our political and military leaders must takes is a mental one and that is to accept the fact that National Guard combat brigades cannot meet the 90 day deployment standard. This has nothing to do with increasing the readiness of enhanced Brigades but is an important step which can build the bridges for policy adjustments. It is also important because our operational war plans as well as our strategic lift capabilities within a theater are based on the fact that National Guard combat brigades begin deployment within 90 days of mobilization. As stated this is a risky venture. War planners must adjust their planning guidance. What is the driving force or criteria which requires enhanced brigades to deploy within 90 days? Is the

strategic lift and transportation infrastructure available to move the enhanced brigades at 90 days? Also, what are the train-up plan and lift requirement if six or fifteen enhanced brigades are mobilized? These are serious questions which must be answered.

Planners must incorporate other combat multipliers to compensate for the additional deployment time of the enhanced brigades. The allocation of air, ground and naval forces and more dependence on allies are options available. This is especially important in a two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingency scenario. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that “While enhanced brigades could potentially be used in either MRC, timelines of mobilization and movement make it more likely that they will be used in a second MRC, particularly if any MRC goes adverse.”<sup>31</sup> The adjustment to the planning assumptions are important if the enhanced brigades are to be the nations strategic hedge against the potential of any MRC.

#### **Recommendation Two: Into the Political Minefield**

Few will argue that politics has a stranglehold on the National Guard and that the command structure impairs their ability to function effectively within the Total Army. US military and political leaders must look at innovative approaches to enhance readiness and align the command and control structure of the National Guard with the Total Army policy of “seamless integration”. The most plausible and most politically controversial course of action is to eliminate the state control of the Army National Guard.

At first glance an action of this magnitude seems politically untenable. Yet, why do we have three separate components --active, Reserve, and National Guard -- each carrying on activities in its own “sandbox?” Furthermore, the National Guard of today bears little resemblance to the state militia guarding the borders of the United States over 200 years ago against Indians, insurrection, and invasion. The mission and organization of the National Guard today is entirely different. The only infrastructure which remains from the old militia is the State peacetime control of the National Guard. Jeffery Jacobs in his book The Future of the Citizen Soldier stated the National Guard command structure “is the legacy of a citizen-soldier force designed for a different time, a different place, and a different mission and it is wholly unsuited to the United States Army of the twenty-first century.”<sup>32</sup>

Undoubtedly there are many second and third order effects which must be considered with such an action. The first, of course, is to navigate through the “political minefield” to alter our basic constitution and permanently federalize the National Guard. It makes sense that in this time of fiscal “belt tightening” that if the federal government is to arm, train, and pay the National Guard, and depend on it for a substantial portion of the Army’s combat power in time of war, then the National Guard ought to be fully accountable to the federal government. If we are to really achieve seamless integration, then it is imperative that our political leaders fully explore this course of action.

### **Recommendation Three: New Training Philosophy**

It is time that the Army adopt a fresh training philosophy towards the National Guard. FORSCOM /ARNG Regulation 350-2 spells out the active component role with respect to the National Guard and Reserve. It is entitled the Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE). Designed to transfer the major part of the direct support of training responsibility to the CONUSA, it is a complicated program with training assistance roles given to the RTD, Resident Training Teams (RTTs), RTBs, RGs, and the associated active unit. One important aspect of this guidance is the requirement for the active force to evaluate enhanced brigades through the use of the Training Assessment Model (TAM) during annual training.<sup>33</sup> This has caused much concern within the National Guard as well as the active component. The evaluation package seldom comes from the associated unit, and the active component is not enthralled with the prospect of three more weeks added to their operational tempo.

Furthermore, the primary methodology to train National Guard units as outlined by FORSCOM is lane training.<sup>34</sup> Under this concept, enhanced brigade units roll-on and roll-off training lanes without any distractors or support requirements. The units are evaluated by active duty soldiers and retrained as needed. The RTB is organized to execute the lanes.

Although this sounds ideal, we are in fact doing a great disservice to the National Guard enhanced brigades. We have developed a generation of commanders from company to brigade who are unable to adequately assess and evaluate training or

develop and execute viable training plans. In most cases, these are experienced and talented commanders, but they have never had to evaluate or develop training plans because the active component has done it for them.

### **The Changes**

The first step is to adopt a training philosophy which puts the enhanced brigade chain of command in charge. This is in line with FM 25-100, which insists that the brigade commander is the chief trainer and *commanders* assess and evaluate training, not the RTB, RTD, or the associated active component unit. The TAM requirement needs to go away as we know it. The active component whether it be the Resident Training Detachment , RTB or others act as trainers and provide observations to the National Guard commanders who evaluate the training. This same technique is used at the Combat Training Centers. The bottom line is that only commanders evaluate training. This action alleviates tensions between the active and reserve component since the evaluation is really done by the enhanced brigade commanders.

The knowledge and experience gained in the development and building of training events is a key aspect of leader development. The enhanced brigade chain of command must be actively involved in the execution of training plans. Lane training is an excellent technique, but the enhanced brigade commanders are in charge. For example, in a platoon movement to contact lane the enhanced brigade company commander is in charge of the lane and is supported by the active component as observer/trainers. The company commander issues the order, runs the platoon through the lane, and conducts the after-action review with the assistance of the active

component. With this change in philosophy we gain two great advantages. First, we are consistent with Army training philosophy and take another step towards integration. Secondly, this new philosophy teaches our enhanced brigade leaders how to be better trainers and hence better leaders, so when mobilization does come they are more self-sufficient.

**Recommendation Four: Focus Training Strategy -- Back To Basics**

Enhanced brigades must reassess their premobilization training goals to ensure they are consistent with readiness requirements and achievable within available training time and resources. The Army policy to place premobilization training goals for enhanced brigades at the platoon level is a step in the right direction. Yet, the National Guard enhanced brigade working group identified 39 critical platoon tasks for a mechanized infantry platoon.<sup>35</sup> Couple these tasks with gunnery requirements and a unit quickly runs out of time. It simply is not feasible to maintain proficiency in this number of tasks. This becomes clearly evident when you review the results of the three brigades federalized for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. After 90 days , nearly half of the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles crews had not met gunnery qualification standards.<sup>36</sup> They fell into the trap where in their efforts to prepare for everything , they were prepared for nothing.

It is important to develop an optimal training strategy. This suggested training strategy is based on the goals that crews are proficient in gunnery, can accomplish basic fire and maneuver at platoon level, that company commanders know how to fight

platoons, and that the battalion commander and staff can develop and produce an operation order that works.

The centerpiece of this strategy is lethality. Enhanced brigades must be proficient in gunnery from the M-16 rifle to the main gun on the M1 tank and M2 infantry fighting vehicle. It is not only important for survival, but also nearly thirty per cent of estimated postmobilization training time is dedicated to gunnery tables.<sup>37</sup> The assumption is that every crew must fire all tables. Yet, if enhanced brigades were to focus on lethality during premobilization many crews could fire modified tables and progress quickly to a fire and maneuver (Table XII). This saves ammunition and more importantly time. It is critical that enhanced brigade crews are confident and comfortable in the turret before progressing to maneuver. Common sense suggests that if you are unable to effectively acquire and destroy the enemy it makes little difference what you look like when you approach the objective.

Enhanced brigades can further train on no more than three additional platoon collective tasks. The challenge to the commander at all levels is to select the three tasks which best support his Mission Essential Task List (METL). Enhanced brigade commanders at all levels must closely review their METL with their wartime gaining command and select the platoon tasks which best support their mission. Figure two, for example, shows a brigade to platoon METL crosswalk for a mechanized infantry unit based on the assumption the enhanced brigade is associated with an active unit which is offensively oriented .

Figure 2. Brigade to Platoon METL Crosswalk for a Mechanized Infantry Unit.

Brigade METL	Movement to Contact	Attack
Battalion METL	Fight a Meeting Engagement Attack/Counterattack by Fire Assault	Attack/Counter attack by Fire Assault
Company METL	Perform Actions on Contact Support by Fire Perform Attack by Fire	Support by Fire Assault Enemy Position Mounted Assault Enemy Position Dismounted Perform Attack by Fire
Platoon Supporting Tasks	Prepare for Combat React to Contact	Prepare for Combat React to Contact Attack Enemy Position Mounted/ Dismounted Knockout a Bunker (Dismounted)

The brigade METL are movement to contact and attack. The platoon tasks which best support the METL are prep for combat, react to contact, and conduct a Bradley platoon attack. We must also address the dismounted elements of the platoon. Their tasks are prep for combat , react to contact, and knockout a bunker. These are subjective and based on other assumptions commanders may select differently. The point is that National Guard combat brigades cannot train to standard on 39 collective tasks and should use a proven methodology to identify platoon tasks.

Moreover, company commanders can gain experience in employing and fighting their companies through simulation, leader teaches, and by executing platoon lanes as suggested previously. The same is true with battalion commanders and staff. Multiechelon training is the key. For example, during a Bradley Table XII (platoon fire and maneuver), the company commander controls the platoon leader and the battalion commander is controlling the company commander on the battalion command net. The mission they execute is based on an order developed by the battalion, and a company order written by the company commander. Hence, directives are issued just as they are in combat, and the entire team is given a work out with minimum resources.

It is imperative that enhanced brigades develop their yearly training plans based on time as the critical resource. Lethality is focal point that will in the end make a difference. With well trained crews, considerable time can be saved in post mobilization training.

#### **Recommendation five: Restructure Training Time**

As demonstrated there is a great amount of teamwork and training required for mechanized infantry and armor units to maintain proficiency and this cannot be fully achieved on weekends and one two week annual training period. It is also untenable and probably not prudent to increase the number of training days.

Yet, there are major benefits from restructuring the weekend drill program. Currently the National Guard trains 12 weekend periods (24 days) and one 15 day annual training period. It is difficult to accomplish collective training during weekend

drills because of travel time and administrative requirements. The training periods should be adjusted to five weekend drills (10 days), two seven day periods (14 days), and one 15 day annual training session. For example, the weekend drills under this change are an excellent opportunity to conduct administrative matters and to certify leaders and execute rehearsals for upcoming major training events. The first seven day period is dedicated to individual critical skills while the remaining longer sessions are for collective tasks. The commander has the flexibility to space the weekend drills and longer training sessions where they best support his annual training plan and resources available. More importantly, this option negates most of the adverse affects of geography and is the best use of the 39 days. This course of action may require congressional legislation in order to protect the jobs of the national guardsman. Nonetheless, this option permits units to use available training time more efficiently.

#### **Recommendation six: Flexible Response**

A viable option is to abandon the enhanced brigade concept and focus on battalion level and below. The United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) has adopted this policy with great success.<sup>38</sup> In fact, they deployed a tank battalion to Desert Shield within 45 days of mobilization, transitioned into M1A1 Abram tanks and performed superbly in the ground war. The unit was able to integrate smoothly into the active force brigade.

Furthermore, many of the deployments in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are filled by battalion level units, as well as systemic operational deployments such as Intrinsic Action (Kuwait) and Bright Star (Egypt). If the bulk of

the deployments are less than brigade level, why train enhanced brigades to division integration standards? It is at the brigade level that the National Guard enhanced brigades experience the most turbulence and synchronization problems. It is difficult and rare for enhanced brigade staffs and commanders to train routinely with their active counterpart (division) because of operational tempo of the active force and civilian job demands of the National Guard senior leaders. As a result, significant postmobilization training is required. At the battalion level, postmobilization training time decreases significantly because the battalion can integrate smoothly into a better trained and more experienced active brigade. This option provides a more flexible response to the Total Force posture.

### **Summary**

The war-fighting readiness of the National Guard enhanced brigades are more critical today than ever before. They provide one third of the Army's available ground forces and are truly the nations strategic insurance. There are many improvements that have been made in the training readiness of the National Guard with the infusion of resources. Yet, these actions alone have not broken the 90 day readiness paradigm. It is a time for change. All of the above recommendations based on this study's conclusions are practicable. Their implementation will lead to a combination of systemic changes and better interaction among all components of the Army. The Army has made great strides in the last few years in tearing down the antagonisms and discord among the components, but if we are truly to be a seamless Army we need to make significant changes requiring congressional legislation. We have a window of opportunity *now* when the only cost is time, hard work, and dollars --not American

lives.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> US Government Printing Office, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 7.

<sup>2</sup> Frederick J. Brown, "Reserve Forces: Army Challenges of the 1990s," Military Review Vol. 71, (August 1991): 4.

<sup>3</sup> Martin Binkman and William W. Kaufman, US Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, and Risks (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1989), 47-55.

<sup>4</sup> Jerry C. Smithers, Reserve Component Training Under CAPSTONE, Study Project. (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1989), 3-6.

<sup>5</sup> US General Accounting Office, Army National Guard: Combat Brigades' Capability to be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain, Report to Congressional Committees (Washington: US General Accounting Office, 1995), 12.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>7</sup> J.H.Binfoid Peay III and John R D'Araujo Jr. and Max Baratz, "Building for the Future: The Active/Reserve Offsite Agreement," Army 44 (November 1994): 48.

<sup>8</sup> Binkin and Kaufman , US Army Guard & Reserve, 41.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 42.

<sup>10</sup> I. Heymont and E.W.McGregor, Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of US Army Reserve Components (McLean: Research Analysis Corp., 1972), chap.2.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 27

<sup>12</sup> Gary L. Adams and Dwain L Crowson, "The Army National Guard in a Changing Strategic Environment," Military Review vol. 71 (October 1991): 40.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>14</sup> US General Accounting Office, Army National Guard, 3.

<sup>15</sup> Jacobs, Jeffery, Future of the Citizen Soldier: Issues and Answers (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 99.

<sup>16</sup> US General Accounting Office, Army National Guard, 34.

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<sup>17</sup> US General Accounting Office, National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War: Report to the Secretary of Defense (Washington: US General Accounting Office, 1991), 3.

<sup>18</sup> Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen Soldier, 68.

<sup>19</sup> Binkin and Kaufman, US Army Guard& Reserve, 98.

<sup>20</sup> US General Accounting Office, The Army National Guard, 27.

<sup>21</sup> Jacobs, The Future of the Citizen Soldier, 73.

<sup>22</sup> US Government Printing Office, The Constitution of the United States of America (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1992), 5.

<sup>23</sup> Jacobs, Future of the Citizen Soldier, 9-10.

<sup>24</sup> Department of the Army, Training the Force, Field Manual 25-100 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, 15 November, 1988), 1-5.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 4-3.

<sup>26</sup> Jacobs , Jeffery A., "Integrating the Total Army: The Road to Reserve Readiness," Parameters Vol. 22, (December 1990): 75-76.

<sup>27</sup> US General Accounting Office, The Army National Guard, 12.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 40-44.

<sup>31</sup> McAndrews, Kevin, "Just What the Doctor Ordered," National Guard Vol. 159, (September 1995): 28.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 142.

<sup>33</sup> Department of the Army, Reserve Component Training In America's Army, FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2 (Washington: US Department of the Army, February 1996), 5.

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<sup>34</sup> FORSCOM Commander John H. Tilelli, "Reserve Component Premobilization Training," memorandum for Corps Commanders,, Fort Mcpherson , Georgia, 1 December 1995.

<sup>35</sup> US General Accounting Office, Army National Guard, 19.

<sup>36</sup> US General Accounting Office, National Guard: Peacetime Training , 3.

<sup>37</sup> Rand Corporation, Post Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1992), 32.

<sup>38</sup> Department of the Navy, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, Field Manual 1-2 (Washington: US Department of the Navy, 1 June 1991) 4-11.



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